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Full transparency is not always a good thing: countdown
signals at intersections make pedestrians safer, but also lead to
more collisions.
No matter people’s major mode of transportation, they are almost certain to be a pedestrian at
some stage of the journey. Having better information in busy urban areas, such as countdowns at
intersections, can help to make being a pedestrian safer. Using Toronto as a case study, Sacha
Kapoor and Arvind Magesan investigate the effects of introducing pedestrian countdowns on
pedestrian and automobile safety. They find that while countdowns do make pedestrians safer,
they also can lead to an increase in automobile accidents, as they facilitate more aggressive
driving. They argue that in these sorts of contexts, full transparency of local information may not
necessarily lead to the best outcomes for all.
Pedestrian Countdown Signals have spread to cities across the globe, from New York and
London to Mexico City and New Delhi, and from Oakland and Oxford to the smaller cities of Asia
and Africa.  The signals are visible countdowns that display the time until a traffic light changes
from green to yellow, and their purpose is to make life safer for people travelling by foot along our
roads. Apparently, having better information about the time until the next light change improves
your chances of crossing the street in one piece.
Whereas the intent is to inform pedestrians, in many cities the countdowns are visible to all visitors of an
intersection. This includes drivers who can, for example, use the countdown to adjust the speed at which they
approach. If drivers tend to use countdowns to “beat the light” then intersections can, in fact, become more
dangerous for everyone. This very real possibility means that cities, when considering pedestrian countdown
signals for their streets, might do well by first taking into account the implications of the signals for the safety of
road users overall.
In a recent study we used data
from the City of Toronto to
consider these issues. We
investigated whether advertised
countdowns improve the safety of
pedestrians, whether they
facilitate aggression on the part of
drivers, and the overall
implications for the safety of all
road users. We found that while
countdowns do reduce the
number of pedestrians hit by
cars, they actually increase the
number of traffic collisions.
Toronto provides a near ideal
context for assessing the impact
of pedestrian countdown signals.
Other studies that analyze the
impact of countdowns use data
from contexts where countdowns are installed at select intersections. To assess the impact of countdowns, the
studies then either compare accidents at intersections with countdowns and intersections without or compare
accidents at the same intersection before and after the installation.  These sorts of comparisons across
intersections are problematic because intersections can differ in many ways, such as foot or car traffic, and
because city officials probably account for the differences when deciding where to install countdowns. In such
instances it is difficult to separate the pure impact of countdowns from the influence of good (or bad) decision
making by city officials.
Comparisons over time of the same intersection are problematic because of changes in road user behavior that
arise naturally over time. If drivers are becoming more cautious, perhaps because of media blitzes concerning
traffic safety, then this will result in fewer accidents. If this happens during the periods where countdowns are
being installed, then changes in driver behavior can also confound the pure impact of countdowns.
Our context is nearly ideal because the City inadvertently set up, in effect, a randomized controlled trial. For one,
the City did not place countdowns at select intersections. A countdown was pretty much installed at every
intersection in the city. For two, the rollout of countdowns was gradual. From period to period we observe some
intersections receiving countdowns and some not. This gradual rollout allows us to isolate the effects of
countdowns from the effects of natural changes in driver behavior over time. For three, and perhaps most
importantly, the order of installations was unrelated to patterns of accident histories across the intersections.
Labour costs, above all else, determined where and when the installations were to take place. It is the negligible
role of accident histories in installations decisions that makes random, in effect, the assignment of countdowns to
intersections.
After analyzing the data generated by the City’s “experiment”, we found that countdowns do what they were
intended to do. They reduced the number of pedestrians struck by automobiles. We also found, to our surprise,
that they precipitated about a 5 percent increase in collisions between automobiles per month as well as more
collisions overall. These findings alone suggest that cities can do better by informing pedestrians, and not drivers. 
This could be done, perhaps, by announcing the time remaining through a speaker that only pedestrians can hear.
Once we established the main results, we set forth to understand why countdowns might cause more collisions.
One theory, as we already discussed, is that countdowns facilitate aggression on the part of drivers. Another is
that countdowns are distracting to drivers. Drivers watch the countdowns instead of keeping their eyes on the
drivers in front of (and behind) them.
The welcome thing about data from the city of Toronto is that it allows us to sort through the two theories. To do so
we considered wide gamut of outcomes, such as the number of collisions that were rear ends, head on, involving
a driver making a left turn, etc. We also considered the responses of drivers once they became familiar with the
countdowns.
Our findings point to countdowns as facilitators of aggressive driving. In this regard two findings stand out. As
Figure 1 illustrates, first, countdowns resulted in more rear ends. Second, the overall effect on collisions becomes
stronger as time passes. Drivers who know the time that remains can more easily determine whether, by speeding
up, they can make the light. When they do speed up, and the driver in front does not, the chances of a collision
increase. While the first finding is also consistent with countdowns distracting drivers, the second finding is not. If
countdowns are distracting then their effect should be largest right after the installations, before drivers familiarize
themselves with the new signals. A large initial effect is the opposite of what we find.
Figure 1 – Pedestrian Countdown Signals and Their Effects on Collisions
Finally, we also considered the broader applicability of our findings, first for other cities and second for
policymakers. In the study we determined that countdowns had the largest effects at intersections that were
historically safe, and may in fact reduce collisions at the most dangerous intersections. The finding has two
implications. First, cities may benefit from selectively placing countdowns at historically dangerous intersections
but not at historically safe ones. Second, while city-wide countdown installations can improve safety in cities
where accidents are commonplace, they may reduce safety in cities where accidents rarely happen.
The broader lesson is: full transparency is not always a good thing. The principles at play in our setting also apply
to other settings. The principles explain why, for example, authorities do not cry fire or announce bomb threats
publicly. Keeping the threats hidden from the public eye can, at least for a short while, serve rather than harm the
public interest.
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